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Abstract
Saving opportunities can only be oﬀered in group-lending by re-
stricting the number of borrowers in a group, thus creating intra-group
competition for loans. Our model predicts that this would lead to
negative assortative matching along wealth lines (the wealthy would
group with poorer individuals). We ﬁnd that in a two member group,
the borrower’s wealth threshold for joining the group would be greater
than the non-borrower’s wealth threshold. The non-borrower’s wealth
threshold increases and the borrower’s wealth threshold decreases with
the cost of capital, thus widening the gap between the two thresholds.
We thus highlight the two countervailing eﬀects of subsidising the cost
of capital, i.e., the trade-oﬀ between raising the wealth threshold for
joining the group as a non-borrower and decreasing the expected time
it would take to loosen the wealth deprived non-borrower’s credit con-
straints.
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11 Introduction
Microﬁnance is meant to be a panacea for poverty alleviation. In mainstream
media as well as in the literature, it is often perceived as an institutional
apparatus which allows the poor to borrow. At the conceptual level, it is
not entirely clear whether it is better to oﬀer the poor a way to save their
way out of poverty or to borrow their way out of poverty or both.1 Our
objective in this paper is to examine the institutional design of microﬁnance
institutions which oﬀer the poor both opportunities, namely, to be able to
borrow and save. We then use this framework to analyse how the government
can use the interest rate policy2 to maximise the outreach or, in other words,
minimise the wealth threshold for accessing the ﬁnancial services oﬀered by
these institutions.
We ﬁnd that the interest rate policy would have a very diﬀerent impact in
terms of outreach for these two diﬀerent types of microﬁnance institutions,
i.e., the type that allows their clients to both borrow and save from the type
that only allows them to borrow. We are thus able to scrutinise the long
held view in microﬁnance that subsidising the cost of capital is an eﬀective
way of helping the poorest.(See Conning (1999), Hulme and Mosley (1996)
and Morduch (2000) for articulation of this so called “welfarist” approach.)
We ﬁnd that subsidising the cost of capital actually harms the ability of the
poorest to join the type of microﬁnance institutions which oﬀer opportunities
to save as well as borrow.
1Armend´ ariz de Aghion and Morduch (2005, pp.172) highlight the changing attitudes
of microﬁnance practitioners and policymakers towards oﬀering saving opportunities when
they write that “(they) are coming around to the view that facilitating savings may often
be more important than ﬁnding better ways to lend to low income customers, especially
for the most impoverished households ...the two (approaches) are complementary ...”
2Ramachandran and Swaminathan (2005) document how the Indian government has
been able force the banks in India to lend a speciﬁed proportion of their total lending to
targeted areas, thus aﬀecting the opportunity cost of capital in these areas.
2The literature on microﬁnance has hitherto almost exclusively focussed on
mechanisms that allow the wealth-deprived (collateral-deﬁcient) individuals
to (only) borrow in jointly liable groups. The liability the borrowers bear for
each other within the group compensates for their lack of ownership of stock
assets which could serve as collateral.3
The literature, with the exception of Banerjee et al. (1994), has ignored
the implication of oﬀering saving opportunities within the group lending
mechanism. Whilst analysing the internal structure of a cooperative, where
members of the cooperative borrow both internally and externally, Banerjee
et al. (1994) show that if the funds are borrowed internally, a premium4 needs
to be paid on the internally borrowed funds. Our objective in this paper is
to push this further and endogenise the group formation process in order
to analyse the composition of groups that are formed under this lending ar-
rangement. Our model predicts that oﬀering the opportunity to both save
and borrow within the groups would lead to negative assortative matching
along wealth lines, i.e., wealthy individuals would group with poorer individ-
uals.
In a seminal paper, Ghatak (1999) has shown that in an adverse-selection
framework with joint liability there is positive assortative matching amongst
the borrowers in a group. That is, the borrowers ﬂock together with their own
risk type. The safe-type group with the safe-type and the risky-type group
3The recurrent theme in the moral hazard literature on group lending has been that
when lending to individuals with insuﬃcient wealth (collateral), making borrowers jointly
liable for their peer’s outcome induces them to eﬀectively collude, i.e., behave coopera-
tively. Collusion leads to gains in lending eﬃciency as rents allocated to the group to
prevent collusion are lower than rents allocated to the borrowers in individual lending.
Stiglitz (1990), Varian (1990) and Ghatak and Guinnane (1999) show that when indi-
viduals have no wealth and monitoring is costless, peer monitoring can be engendered
by inducing the borrowers in the group to collude on their actions. Conning (1996) and
Conning (2000) show that this remains true even when monitoring is costly.
4compensating the source of these internal funds for monitoring the borrower(s) and
bearing the liability for their failure to repay.
3with the risky-type of borrowers. The lender can screen the borrowers by
varying the interest rate and the degree of joint liability of the loan contract.
This paper shows that wealth could be another relevant dimension in group
formation.
We have a standard moral hazard setup with costly monitoring in which
the lender lends to a jointly liable group of two. The lender can only oﬀer
saving opportunities by restricting the number of people who can simulta-
neously borrow within a group at a point in time.5 Thus, only one group
member’s project is ﬁnanced and the group members decide6 amongst them-
selves which member gets to borrow for her project. This has the eﬀect of
creating intra-group competition for the loan.7
A group is thus composed of a borrower and a non-borrower. The lender
directly inﬂuences the borrower’s eﬀort choice by requiring her to partly self-
ﬁnance her project. Further, the lender indirectly inﬂuences the borrower’s
eﬀort choice by giving her peer (non-borrower) incentives to monitor the
borrower. This is done by requiring that the non-borrower acquires a stake in
the borrower’s project. We are able to derive the respective wealth thresholds
for joining the groups as a borrower and a non-borrower (i.e., a saver). We
ﬁnd that the wealth threshold to be a borrower is greater than the wealth
threshold to be a non-borrower in the group. Thus, the individuals who
do not have suﬃcient wealth to be able to borrow, become equity investors
5Aniket (2006), Roy Chowdhury (2005) and Varian (1990) have found that lending
sequentially within the group (with the proviso that a group member’s loan is contingent
on all previous borrowers’ successful repayment of their respective loans) increases the
lending eﬃciency by lowering the rents allocated to the borrowers. In sequential lending
every group member gets to borrow unless the group disbands prematurely due to default
by a borrower. Conversely, in our one period setup in this paper, the number of loans are
restricted such that all members in the group cannot simultaneously borrow. Further, the
group necessarily disbands once these loans are repayed or defaulted upon.
6If the group is not able to reach a decision, a randomly chosen member gets the loan.
7We thus extend the framework of models of ﬁnancial intermediation like Diamond
(1984) and Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) to group lending.
4(savers) in the relatively-wealthy borrower’s project.
By oﬀering opportunities to save, the lender unwittingly provides incen-
tives for the relatively wealthy to group with individuals poorer than them-
selves. By grouping with individuals who do not have suﬃcient wealth to
borrow, the relatively wealthy are able to eliminate intra-group competition
for loans.
We analyse how the respective wealth thresholds vary with the opportu-
nity cost of capital in the economy. We ﬁnd that as the cost of capital is
lowered through subsidy, the minimum wealth required to be a borrower is
reduced. This is because as the borrower’s interest burden of the loan de-
creases with subsidy, the lender is able to maintain the borrower’s incentive
for eﬀort while concurrently reducing her stake in her own project. Con-
versely, the minimum wealth required to be a non-borrower increases with
subsidy. With lower interest rates, the non-borrower is compensated for her
monitoring eﬀort through a greater stake in the borrower’s project.
Subsidy closes the gap between the minimum wealth required to be a
borrower and a non-borrower in the group. This reduces the expected time
(in terms of number of loan cycles) it would take an individual below the
borrower’s wealth threshold to accumulate suﬃcient wealth to be able to
borrow. The aim here is to highlight the dual eﬀect of subsidy. In terms of
outreach, subsidy actually harms the interest of the poorest by increasing the
wealth threshold for joining the groups. Conversely, it is beneﬁcial for a poor
individual who is able to join the group as a non-borrower as it decreases
the expected time taken for the non-borrower to graduate on to becoming
a borrower. Thus, there exists a clear trade-oﬀ between outreach and the
expected time it takes to loosen the wealth-deﬁcient non-borrower’s credit
constraint.
5To make matters concrete, we deﬁne the optimal cost of capital, in this
context, as the one which minimises the wealth required to join the group as
a non-borrower subject to the constraint that these non-borrowers can accu-
mulate suﬃcient wealth and thus graduate on to becoming borrowers (with
a positive probability) in one loan cycle. If the government can inﬂuence the
cost of capital, they should aim for this rate.
We have conﬁned ourselves to the problem of the borrower’s eﬀort choice
before the project is undertaken. Other papers in the microﬁnance litera-
ture have shown that joint liability group lending can alleviate information
problems like adverse selection (Armend´ ariz de Aghion and Gollier (2000),
Ghatak (2000), Laﬀont and NGuessan (2000) and Van Tassel (1999)) and
strategic default (Besley and Coate (1995) and Che (1999)) associated with
lending to the poor. Ghatak and Guinnane (1999) and Morduch (1999) are
two excellent recent surveys in this area.
2 Model
There are two agents. Each agent has access to an identical project which
requires a lump-sum investment of 1 unit of capital. The project produces
an uncertain and observable outcome x, valued at ¯ x when it succeeds (s) and
0 when it fails (f).
2.1 Agents
Each agent k is risk neutral, with zero reservation wage income and wk cash
wealth. Agents have no collateralizable wealth. (wk < 1 ∀ k)
Agents may choose to pursue the project with a high (H) or low (L)
eﬀort, which is unobservable to everyone. With a high (low) eﬀort, ¯ x is
6realised with probability πh (πl) and 0 with 1 − πh (1 − πl). (πh > πl)
By exerting low eﬀort, agents obtain a private beneﬁt of value B from
the project which is non-pecuniary and non-transferable amongst the agents.
The private beneﬁts can be curtailed by monitoring, which is undertaken at
cost c to the monitor. The cost of monitoring is non-pecuniary.
The only connection that agents have amongst themselves is their ability
to monitor each other and curtail each other’s private beneﬁts. The agents
can observe the monitoring amongst themselves but it is unobservable to the
lender. We impose the following assumptions on the monitoring function
B(c).
Assumption 1 (Monitoring function).
i. B(c) is continuous and twice diﬀerentiable
ii. B(0) > 0, B′(c) < 0, B′′(c) > 0
2.2 Lender
The lender is risk neutral and does not have the ability to monitor or punish
the agents in any way, except through their payoﬀs. He can costlessly observe
the initial capital invested in the project as well as the output from the
project.
The opportunity cost of capital for everyone in the area is ρ. The lender
has access to capital at ρ and the agents can obtain a return of ρ on their
savings. We assume that the lender, due to the competition he faces, is
unable to obtain an ex ante return on the capital he lends, over and above
ρ, his opportunity cost of capital.
73 Individual Lending
In this section, we examine the case where an individual borrower undertakes
a project by investing 1 unit of capital. The lender lends her (1 − wb) and
requires that she invest wb of her own cash wealth in the project. The lender





E [bi | H] > ρwb (1)
E[bi | H ] > E[bi | L] + B(0) (2)




where bi is the borrowers payoﬀ in state i = {s,f}. (1), (2) and (3) are the
borrower’s participation, incentive compatibility and limited liability con-
straints. L-ZPC is the lender’s zero proﬁt condition. If the project succeeds,
the borrower repays the lender r(1−wb), and keeps the rest, i.e., ¯ x−r(1−wb)
for herself. If the project fails both get 0.
In the ﬁrst-best world,8 where eﬀort is observable, there is no minimum
wealth required for borrowing from the lender if ¯ x >
ρ
πh, that is, the project
is socially viable.
3.1 Unobservable Eﬀort
In the ﬁrst-best world, there is no tension between r and wb because eﬀort
is observable and thus contractible. The tension between r and wb emerges
when the eﬀort is unobservable and thus needs to be incentivised.
8i.e., when (2) is ignored.
8The borrower’s incentive compatibility constraint (2) can be written as





where ∆π = πh − πl.9 With unobservable eﬀort, in-
creasing r reduces the borrower’s incentive for high eﬀort.10 This can be com-
pensated by increasing wb, the borrower’s stake in her own project. Thus,
given r, there is a minimum wb required for the contract to be incentive
compatible. Further, wb required by the lender increases with r, and given
the lender’s zero proﬁt condition (L-ZPC), increases with ρ, the opportunity
cost of capital.
3.2 Contract
The lender’s objective function is decreasing in wb. In order to align the
borrower’s incentive in his favour, the lender oﬀers the borrower a contract
(r,wI
b), requiring the borrower to invest at least wI
b of her own cash wealth
in the project where
w
I










We know from the lender’s objective function that he would like to lend
as much as he can to the borrowers and would not let the borrowers invest
more than that speciﬁed by (4).
Any agent k with cash wealth wk(> wI
b) will accept the contract (r,wI
b)




10Increasing r reduces the borrower’s expected pecuniary payoﬀ from high eﬀort (πh[¯ x−
r(1 − wb)]) more than from the low eﬀort (πl[¯ x − r(1 − wb)]), given that πh > πl. This
reduces her incentive to pursue the project with high eﬀort and lose B(0), the private
beneﬁts associated with low eﬀort.
9πhx− 











Figure 1: Minimum Wealth Required to Borrow in Individual lending
oﬀered by the lender if
ρ(wk − w
I
b ) + π
h[ ¯ x − r(1 − w
I
b)] > ρwk.
The above condition is satisﬁed for ¯ x >
ρ
πh.
Lemma 1 (Individual Lending). wI
b, the minimum wealth required to borrow
from the lender increases with ρ, the cost of capital and decreases with ¯ x, the
productivity of the project.
We can see from Figure 1 that as ρ increases, the borrower’s interest
burden on the loan increases, which in turn implies that her incentive for
high eﬀort would only be restored if she is required to acquire greater stake
in her project. Similarly, the wealth required to borrow decreases in ¯ x, the
productivity of the project. Thus, subsidising the cost of capital lowers the
wealth threshold for borrowing individually.
104 Group Lending
A group is endogenously formed and consists of two agents, a borrower and a
saver (non-borrower). The borrower is the agent that undertakes the project,
and the saver is the one that co-ﬁnances the project. The lender allows only
one member of the group to borrow and the group disbands once the project’s
outcome has been realised.
We assume that the combined cash wealth of the borrower and the saver
is less than the initial capital required for the project. The agents form a
group with the purpose of borrowing capital from the lender to enable the
borrower to undertake her project.
4.1 The Mechanism
The lender speciﬁes the amount of wealth the borrower and the saver are
required to invest in the project and their respective payoﬀs in the contract.
The borrower invests wb and the saver invests ws in the project. The group
borrows 1−(ws+wb), which is the rest of the capital required for the project,
from the lender.
wb ws 1− ws− wb 
R r
Lender’s Capital Saver’s Capital Borrower’s Capital Source of Capital
Cost of capital
0 1
Figure 2: Source and Cost of Capital in Group Lending
If the project succeeds, the saver gets a return R on her capital ws and
the lender gets a return r on his capital (1 − ws − wb). The borrower is the
residual claimant of the output. That is, the saver gets a payoﬀ ss = Rws
11and the lender gets a payoﬀ ls = r(1 − ws − wb). The borrower’s payoﬀ is
bs = ¯ x−Rws−r(1−ws−wb). Conversely, if the project fails, sf = lf = bf = 0.
The timing is as follows:
t=1 The lender announces the group contract. (w∗
s,R∗) and (w∗
b,r) are the
saver’s (non-borrower’s) and the borrower’s component of the contract.
t=2 Given the group contract, the agents self-select into the roles of the
saver and the borrower. Subsequently, they pair up to form a group.
t=3 The group borrows (1 − w∗
b − w∗
s) from the lender and the borrower
invests 1 unit of capital into her project.
t=4 The saver chooses her monitoring intensity c.
t=5 The borrower chooses her eﬀort level.
t=6 The project outcome is realised and the saver, the borrower and the
lender get their respective payoﬀs.
The borrower’s and saver’s (monitor’s) contracts work in conjunction with
each other. The lender is able to inﬂuence the borrower’s eﬀort choice directly
through her own payoﬀs and indirectly through the saver’s payoﬀs. Given
that the saver’s payoﬀs are contingent on the outcome of the borrower’s
project, she has explicit incentives to monitor the borrower and curtail her
private beneﬁts. An optimal group contract ensures that the borrower pur-
sues her project with high eﬀort.
The borrower’s participation constraint (B-PC) and the incentive com-
patibility constraint (B-ICC) are given by
π
h [¯ x − r(1 − ws − wb) − Rws] > ρwb (B-PC)
12π
h [¯ x − r(1 − ws − wb) − Rws]
> π
l [¯ x − r(1 − ws − wb) − Rws] + B(c) (B-ICC)
The saver’s participation constraint (S-PC) and the incentive compatibil-
ity constraint (S-ICC) are given by
π
hRws − c > ρws (S-PC)
π
hRws − c > π
lRws. (S-ICC)
4.2 Lender’s Problem
The lender would like to maximise his revenue whilst concurrently ensuring
that the borrower exerts high eﬀort. The lender’s problem is as follows:
max φ = π
hr(1 − ws − wb)
subject to the lender’s zero proﬁt condition (L-ZPC), the saver’s and the
borrower’s participation constraints, (S-PC) and (B-PC), and incentive com-
patibility constraints, (B-PC) and (B-ICC). There is an obvious tension be-
tween the lender maximising his objective function and giving the group a
suﬃcient collective stake in the project so that the borrower exerts high ef-
fort. The lender’s problem is solved in Appendix C. An intuitive discussion
of the solution follows.
4.3 Discussion
For a given c, the borrower’s and the saver’s participation constraints and the
saver’s incentive compatibility constraint can be mapped in (R,ws), saver’s
13contract space. These respective constraints can be written as follows:







¯ x − r > (R − r)ws (B-PC)
Figure 3 maps (S-PC), (S-ICC) and (B-ICC) for a positive value of c. The
saver’s participation and incentive compatibility constraints are violated to
the left of the curves. The borrower’s participation constraint is violated to














Figure 3: Borrower’s and Saver’s Constraints for a given c
144.3.1 Saver’s Decision







participation constraint binds and the incentive compatibility constraint re-
mains slack. Conversely, for R >
ρ
πl, the saver’s incentive compatibility
constraint binds and the participation constraint remains slack. This holds




The borrower’s participation constraint serves to restrict the contracts
that the saver can be oﬀered. Only a saver’s contract which is to the left of
the (B-PC) in Figure 3 will satisfy the borrower’s participation constraint.
Given a contract (R,ws), the saver will choose c, her monitoring intensity,







make her incentive compatibility constraint bind if R >
ρ
πl. The borrower
will choose high eﬀort if her incentive compatibility constraint is satisﬁed
and the saver’s contract satisﬁes her participation constraint.







the saver’s contract is on her participation constraint and she gets zero rent.
Conversely, the borrower gets positive rents given that her participation con-
straint is slack.
As R increases in the range R >
ρ
πl, the saver’s incentive compatibility
constraint binds and the saver’s contract moves away from her participation
constraint. The saver’s rents increase as the distance between her contract
and her participation constraint increases. Concurrently, the borrower’s rent
decreases as the distance between the saver’s contract and the borrower’s
participation constraint decreases.
Given the saver’s contract (R,ws), the borrower’s incentive compatibility
constraint gives us the lower bound on wb, the wealth threshold to be a
15borrower in the group.















By substituting the respective binding constraints, i.e., (S-PC), (S-ICC),
(B-ICC) and (L-ZPC),11 into the lender’s objective function, the lender’s











The lender’s problem is solved in Appendix C and the result is summarised
in Lemma 2.
Lemma 2. For projects ¯ x >
ρ+c∗
πh ,12
i. the lender induces the saver to monitor with intensity c∗ by setting
R = R∗ where R∗ =
ρ
πl, B′(c∗) = −1,
ii. the borrower in the group obtains positive rent while the saver obtains
zero rent.





















. In this contract, the saver’s
participation constraint binds and the borrower’s participation constraint
remains slack.
11Appendix A shows that (B-PC) gives us an upper bound on c. (B-PC) remains






, and binds only for








. The optimal contracts for these projects are
derived in Appendix C.1.1.








, the optimal contracts are given in Appendix C.1.1.
16Lemma 3. Group lending is only feasible if ρ > ˜ ρ where














For ρ 6 ˜ ρ, the wealth threshold to be a borrower is less than the wealth
threshold to be a saver, i.e., w∗
s > w∗
b. Agents with wealth in the range [w∗
b,1)
would choose to be a borrower. No agent in this range would choose to be a
saver. Consequently, groups would not be formed and the lender would have
to revert to individual lending.
Group lending is only feasible if ρ > ˜ ρ. In this range, the wealth threshold
for borrowers is always greater than the wealth threshold for savers, i.e.,
w∗
s < w∗
b. An agent with wealth in the range [w∗
b,1) can either be a borrower
or a saver. They would however choose to be a borrower and thus obtain
positive economics rents. Agents with wealth in the range [w∗
s,w∗
b) have no
choice but to become savers in the group.
Proposition 1. The minimum collective group wealth required to borrow in




b gives us B(c∗) + c∗ < B(0), which holds true given the
assumptions on B(c).
4.4 Group Formation
Proposition 2 (Negative Assortative Matching). If ρ > ˜ ρ, an agent with
enough wealth to be a borrower will always prefer to pair up with an agent
who has enough wealth to be a saver but not enough to be a borrower and vice
versa.
Let’s assume that agents k1 and k2 have enough cash wealth to be bor-
rowers, that is, wk1,wk2 ∈ [w∗
b,1). Agents n1 and n2 have enough cash wealth
17to be savers but not borrower, that is wn1,wn2 ∈ [w∗
s,w∗
b).
For agent k1, paring up with agent n1 (or n2) will ensure that she would




b) + E[bi | H] (5)
For agent k1, pairing up with agent k2 would imply that she would have
to compete with agent k2 to become the borrower in the group. We assume
that if agents in the group compete for the role of the borrower, the role is
allocated randomly to an agent. The other agent has to take on the role of


















Comparing (5) with (6), agent k1 would prefer to pair up with agent n1
over agent k2 if ¯ x >
c∗+ρ
πh .
Similarly, agent n1 would prefer to pair up with an agent k1 (or k2) over








Agent n1’s ﬁnal payoﬀ from pairing up with agent k1 is given by the LHS.
Her payoﬀ from pairing with agent n2 is given by the RHS. Given that (7)
holds with an equality, agent n1 is indiﬀerent between the two choices.
185 Cost of Capital
Let us analyse the costs and beneﬁts of inﬂuencing the cost of capital in terms
of its ability to reach the poorest. The government intervenes in the loan
market by either augmenting or decreasing the supply of loanable funds. This
lowers the cost of capital or decreases ρ. We assume that the policymaker’s
ability to inﬂuence ρ is limited. She can inﬂuence ρ by a small amount, δ in
either direction.
We examine the eﬀect of subsidising (lowering) the cost of capital on
outreach, i.e., the minimum wealth required for accessing the services oﬀered
by the microﬁnance institutions. This wealth threshold is given by w∗
s(ρ) if
˜ ρ < ρ and by wI
b(ρ) if ρ 6 ˜ ρ.
Proposition 3. Subsidising the cost of capital decreases the wealth required
to participate in the group as a borrower. Conversely, it increases the wealth
required to participate in the group as a saver.
Diﬀerentiating w∗
s and w∗
b with respect to ρ allows us to examine the ef-

























Subsidising the cost of capital
or decreasing ρ decreases w∗
b and increases w∗
s.13 Thus, in group lending, sub-
sidy lowers the minimum wealth required to join as a borrower but increases
the minimum wealth required to join as a saver14.
Thus, subsidising the cost of capital has two eﬀects. It curtails access to
the group lending for the poor by raising w∗
s. On the other hand, it closes
the gap between w∗
s and w∗
b, thus decreasing the expected time a saver takes
13Overall, (w∗
s+w∗





















14The intuition is that with a lower ρ, the lender requires the saver to have a higher
stake in the borrower’s project in order to compensate her for her monitoring costs.
19to graduate on to become a borrower. To take the analysis a step further, we
can deﬁne the optimal cost of capital as the one which minimises the wealth
required to join group lending as a saver whilst concurrently allowing each
saver to graduate on to becoming a borrower with the probability πh in just
one loan cycle.
Lemma 4. There exists a ˆ ρ such that for all ρ ∈ ( ˜ ρ, ˆ ρ] the savers are able
to accumulate enough wealth to be able to borrow in the next period, if the
current project succeeds.
If the borrower’s project succeeds, the savers of this period can accu-

















. ˆ ρ is the optimal cost of capital
as it minimizes w∗
s subject to the constraint (8).
With ρ = ˆ ρ, the poorest agents with suﬃcient wealth to be savers in this
period can hope to become borrowers with probability πh in the next period.
This would start a process by which a proportion πh of all savers in this
period would become borrowers in the next period and pair up with agents
aspiring to be savers. This process would be particularly helpful if wealth
distribution is skewed and the relatively wealthy agents with cash wealth
wk > w∗
b are in short supply. We summarise this with a proposition.
Proposition 4. At the optimal cost of capital ˆ ρ, the group lending pro-
gramme can concurrently reach the poorest agents and, with probability πh,
enrich them suﬃciently at the end of the period so that they can borrow in
the next period.
20Figure 4: Reaching the Poor with the Interest Rate Policy
If ρ in the market is greater than ˆ ρ, then the subsidy is warranted. Con-
versely, if ρ in the market is less than ˆ ρ, then curtailing the supply of loanable
funds and driving up the cost of capital towards ˆ ρ would increase the out-
reach.
6 Conclusion
We were able to analyse the lender’s use of wealth in engendering peer moni-
toring when lending to the poor wealth deﬁcient individuals in a jointly liable
group. The lender encourages the poor individuals to form a group of two.
He restricts the credit to each group, allowing only one member from the
group to borrow. The group decides which group member gets the credit.
The lender requires that the borrower in the group partly self-ﬁnances
her project. This helps the lender inﬂuence the borrower’s eﬀort choice and
align her incentives with his own. The lender can reduce the cost of aligning
21the borrower’s incentives with his own by inducing peer monitoring. He
does that by requiring that the non-borrower member of the group makes
an equity investment in the borrower’s project. The equity investment gives
the non-borrower the incentive to inﬂuence the borrower’s eﬀort decision by
monitoring her. She receives a higher than market return on her equity
investment which compensates her for the cost incurred while monitoring
and bearing the liability for the borrower possible default. Thus, the non-
borrower member is in eﬀect a saver in the group.
The lender oﬀers the group a contract where he speciﬁes the stake that
the borrower and the saver are required to have in the project along with
their respective payoﬀs. We found that the borrower’s wealth threshold was
greater than the non-borrower’s (saver’s) wealth threshold.
By restricting the credit to a group, the lender can unwittingly give the
individuals incentives to group across wealth levels. With the ensuing intra-
group competition for the loan, the individuals who are suﬃciently wealthy
to borrow would choose to group with individuals who have just suﬃcient
wealth to join the group as non-borrowers. In doing so, the relatively wealthy
individuals are able to eliminate intra-group competition for loans.
We showed that if the cost of capital is subsidised or lowered, the bor-
rower’s wealth threshold decreases with it and the saver’s wealth threshold
increases with it. The borrower’s interest burden decreases with the cost of
capital. The lender can thus reduce the stake that the borrower is required
to have in her project. Conversely, the saver’s premium on her equity invest-
ment decreases with the cost of capital. To compensate the saver for the cost
of monitoring, the lender has to increase the saver’s stake in the project.
Thus, subsidy actually decreases outreach in group lending institutions
which oﬀer opportunities to save. Conversely, it closes the gap between the
22borrower and the non-borrower’s wealth thresholds, thus reducing the ex-
pected time it would take for a non-borrower to accumulate suﬃcient wealth
and graduate on to becoming a borrower.
We were able to solve for the optimal cost of capita in this context deﬁned
as the one which minimises the wealth required to join the group as a non-
borrower subject to the constraint that these non-borrowers can graduate on
to becoming borrowers (with a positive probability) in one loan cycle. If the
policymakers are able to inﬂuence the cost of capital, they should try to push
the cost of capital towards this optimal rate. Subsidy only helps the poorest
if the cost of capital is above this rate. Conversely, if the cost of capital is
below the optimal rate, subsidy would harm the interest of the poorest by
excluding them from the group lending mechanism.
The policy prescription for interest rate policy would depend on whether
the group lending microﬁnance institutions oﬀer saving opportunities or not.
If they do not, then subsidy would unequivocally increase the outreach. Con-
versely, if these institutions do oﬀer saving opportunities, the argument is
more nuanced. There exists a trade-oﬀ between outreach and the time it
takes to loosen the non-borrower’s credit constraint which the policy makers
should be aware of when listening to the arguments made by the “welfarists”.
23Appendix
A Maximum Feasible Monitoring
A saver’s contract is only feasible if (B-PC) is not to the left of (S-PC). This
gives us the following condition:
(¯ x − r) > ws (R − r) >
c
πh
The borrower’s participation constraint gives us the ﬁrst and the saver’s
participation constraint gives us the second inequality from the left. From
this we get an upper bound on the monitoring intensity c.
Lemma 5. The maximum monitoring that can be induced for a project is
given by the following inequality.
c 6 π
h(¯ x − r)
B Existence of ¯ R
For the sake of completeness, we look at conditions under which ¯ R exists in
Figure 3. ¯ R is deﬁned by the intersection of the (B-PC) and (S-ICC). But
they do not necessarily intersect. If they intersect, it just means that the
borrower’s rent can be driven down to zero.
¯ R =

   







  if c > ∆π(¯ x − r),
∄ if c 6 ∆π(¯ x − r).
(9)
(9) implies that ¯ R exists only for a low-productivity high-monitoring
24combination. Given a project’s productivity ¯ x, a monitoring intensity c <
∆π(¯ x − r) can be induced without driving the borrower’s rent to zero. For
higher monitoring intensity c > ∆π(¯ x − r), the maximum return the saver
can be given on her capital is given by ¯ R.
To summarise, the set of all the saver’s contracts (R,ws) that satisfy


























0, ∆π(¯ x − r)
 
where ¯ R is given by (9).
C Group Lending: Lender’s problem
Proof of Proposition 2.






1 − (ws + wb)
 
subject to (B-PC), (B-ICC), (S-PC), (S-ICC) and (L-ZPC).



















. The (S-ICC) binds and (S-PC) is slack if R >
ρ
πl. At R =
ρ
πl both constraints
bind. The (B-PC) is satisﬁed if c 6 πh(¯ x −
ρ
πh).
25Using (L-ZPC), the (B-ICC) can be written as





















By substituting (10) and (11) as binding constraints, the lender’s objec-
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is maximised if the following set of conditions are met.
R >
ρ
















where ˜ c = πh¯ x − ρ
(14)
C.1 The Optimal Contract




, the lender induces monitoring c∗ where B′(c∗) =
−1. The saver and the borrower are oﬀered contracts (R∗,w∗
s) and (r,w∗
b) re-
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, the lender induces monitoring ˜ c < c∗ where
˜ c = πh(¯ x−r). (See Lemma 5)16 Thus, the saver and the borrower are oﬀered

























, the high productivity projects, the optimal contracts
(r,w∗
b) and (R,w∗
s) give the borrower positive and the saver zero economic
rents.
E[bi | H] − ρw
∗
b = π
h(¯ x − r) − c
∗ > 0










, the low productivity projects, the optimal contracts
( ˜ R, ˜ ws) and (r, ˜ wb) give the borrower positive and the saver zero economic
rents.
E[bi | H] − ρ ˜ wb = π
h(¯ x − r) − ˜ c > 0
E[si | H] − ρ ˜ ws − ˜ c = 0








, the lender is not able to induce monitoring intensity
c∗. This is because (R∗,w∗
s), the saver’s contract which is required to induce the saver to
monitor with intensity c∗, violates the borrower’s participation contract.
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